Abstract
which they successfully exploit to access an expanding array of resources. By contrast, the shrinking networks of the poor have reduced their access to decent health care, good education, and timely social assistance, services that are increasingly mediated by personal "connections." Given that person-centered social networks still predominate in Kyrgyz society, the deteriorating networks of the poor should be of serious concern to policymakers. Their deterioration signals that an escalating process of social exclusion is now under way.
We have found it difficult to comprehend the politics of survival in economies that are dominated by non-market forces and that reward blat, stability, conformity, and material equality rather than work, risk, creativity, and personal achievements. Because we live in consumer-oriented societies where virtually all goods and services are available to those who have the money to pay for them, we have brought too many Western economic, social, and psychological assumptions to our analyses of Communist systems. Fleron and Hoffman (1993), p. 174 Ten years ago, the question of whether a hundred friends are better than a hundred rubles in postcommunist Kyrgyz Republic would have been largely rhetorical. In keeping with the sense of this proverb, answers would most likely have confirmed the superior importance of "connections" over cash. Today, however, answers to this question are no longer so predictable. For along with Kyrgyz society as a whole, the scope and function of social networks have been undergoing a dramatic transformation. Because social networks of the poor and nonpoor were moving along different and contrasting trajectories, it became clear that they could best be studied in relation to each other. This study, then, seeks to expand the ways in which issues of the poor have traditionally been studied. It argues that the poor cannot be studied in isolation from the nonpoor, nor can solutions to poverty be devised for them alone. Rather, the success of poverty alleviation in countries in transition depends in equal measure on understanding the emerging nonpoor and their relations to and attitudes toward the new poor. This study provides a unique vantage point from which to consider these relationships on a continuum between poor and nonpoor, as the Kyrgyz Republic moves on the path from a centralized, planned economy to a market economy. In most developing countries of the world, extreme poverty has been a fact of life for generations. By contrast, widespread and severe poverty was new to all but the oldest of our respondents. This study thus focuses on a moment in history when rapid impoverishment has polarized the social networks of the poor and nonpoor, in order to capture the dynamics of how the poor both disengage from and are isolated by and from the nonpoor.
The study of social networks in postsocialist countries is an important tool for bridging the policy gap between macro-level economic strategies and micro-level interventions. These networks provide an essential framework for understanding how informal institutions interact with formal institutions in the postsocialist Kyrgyz Republic. The role of social networks in a society and economy in transition has important implications for institutional reform at every level. Informal networks are not only "safety nets"; they are also institutions that can undermine or sabotage apparently well-designed programs intended to target the poor or marginalized. Qualitative poverty studies conducted in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) have found, for example, that the very poorest lack "insider connections" to formal institutions and are therefore most likely to be excluded from formal assistance. 1 In her study on social networks in Cairo, Diane Singerman (1995, p. 133) found that "networks are the political lifeline of the community, allowing individuals and groups to cooperate with other members of the community to achieve individual and collective goals." A better understanding of the complex relationships between local networks and formal state and international institutions can also yield important insights into derailed reform projects and patterns of corruption (see Stark and Kemeny 1997) .
Recent poverty assessments in Central Asia have not fully examined the ways in which access to information and goods depends on social networks (see Dudwick, Gomart, and Marc (forthcoming) . Understanding how social networks can enhance or restrict peoples' access to limited resources is particularly important in view of growing economic stratification and the increase in structural poverty throughout the region. Despite the introduction of market principles and the gradual depersonalization of economic relations in the Kyrgyz 1. These include studies by Kuehnast (Kyrgyz Republic); Dudwick (Armenia and Georgia); De Soto and Dudwick (Moldova); Gomart (Armenia); Wanner and Dudwick (Ukraine) ; and the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy, Riga, with Dudwick (Latvia) , in Dudwick, Gomart, and Marc (forthcoming) .
Republic, social networks in the transition period remain as important to survival and social mobility as they were during the Soviet-era "shortage" economy. 2 Social relations in Kyrgyz society are based upon person-centered social networks. Thus, in the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as elsewhere in Central Asia, gift-giving and other forms of reciprocity are essential to social life, especially for cultivating, maintaining, and expanding networks important for security and social mobility. During a time when both the state and the market are unreliable, the gift exchange networks still provide social support, personal financing, and mutual assistance in Kyrgyz society. Life-cycle celebrations and rituals that serve as the venue of relationship building usually invigorate such networks. From a study in rural India, Vijayendra Rao (2001) noted that exchange networks, in addition to their central role in helping the poor to cope during difficult times, serve the nonpoor as arenas for status-enhancing competitions. Likewise, in rural communities in the Kyrgyz Republic where banks and other services are unavailable, social networks fueled by these traditions are more valuable than goods or money. Although these networks operate without guidebooks or formal regulations, they can be considered institutions in that they pattern recurrent transactions and exact social consequences for failure to honor agreements. 3 Networks vary in composition and form, from horizontal or flat networks that link equals or near-equals to "vertical" networks-including patron-client relationships-that hierarchically link people with unequal power and access to resources.
Previous studies of informal social networks in Central Asia found that interhousehold transfers were an important safety mechanism for the poor. 4 Today, a new reality is emerging. The poor are being excluded or are withdrawing from those social networks that once offered important support. In response to this trend, the nonpoor indicated in interviews that they are less likely to sustain their relation-2. In contrast to some of its Central Asian neighbors, the Kyrgyz Republic adopted an aggressive strategy of market reform, including widespread privatization, the introduction of a new currency in 1993, and other macroeconomic reforms unique to the region.
3. For further discussion of informal social networks in postsocialist states, see Rose (1999, p. 3) .
4. See Kandiyoti (1998) . See also Coudouel, McAuley, and Micklewight (1997) and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1997). ships with poorer relatives because these relationships are financially draining. This attitude toward the obligation to support extended family members is a major shift in the previous family-centered informal welfare system of the Kyrgyz. Consequently, although the networks of the poor are shrinking and becoming more homogeneous, networks of the nonpoor are expanding and diversifying. These changes parallel the growing chasm between the networks of the poor and of the nonpoor, bridged, if at all, by patron-client relationships. Given that person-centered social networks still predominate in Kyrgyz society, the deteriorating networks of the poor should be of serious concern to policymakers. Their deterioration signals that an escalating process of social exclusion is now under way. Yet it is not enough to understand the networks of the poor. A thorough analysis of the networks of the nonpoor is also critical for understanding how the entire society operates through these informal systems, how formal institutions are brought into the web of personal networks, and how uneven the playing field has become in the new "market economies" of the FSU. 5 The focus of this study on social networks also places it within the purview of social capital research. 6 Discussions of social capital theory distinguish two major approaches to this phenomenon. The first, rooted in the concepts developed by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, and the U.S. sociologist James Coleman, considers individuals and small groups the unit of analysis, and focuses on the ways in which they manipulate social relationships to gain benefits. The other major approach, of greater interest to development specialists, emerged from the work of the political scientist Robert Putnam, who investigated social capital as an attribute of communities and, in some cases, of nations (1993). Putnam and others argue that social capital arises through a dense associational life that produces norms of generalized trust and reciprocity within a community. The level or "stock" of social capital partially determines why some communities are more able than others to mobilize to pursue shared objectives. 7 These two applications of the social capital concept are quite distinct, and as 5. For further discussion of social stratification in Kyrgyz society, see Mikhalev and Heinrich (1999) .
6. See the informally published and circulated Social Capital Initiative Working Paper Series published by the World Bank in 1999.
7. Portes and Landolt (2000) . See also Foley (1998 and for useful syntheses of the work by Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam.
Alejandro Portes (Portes and Landolt 2000, p. 535) suggests, can be contradictory. In the case where individuals or small groups use their connections to bend regulations and gain access to public resources, for example, "individual social capital in such instances consists precisely in the ability to undermine collective social capital, defined as 'civic spirit.'" Portes also points to a confusion between social capital as cause and effect, when in fact high levels of community solidarity might accompany economic growth because both have been shaped by an external factor. We consider this study more in line with social capital theories that consider social capital as a dependent rather than independent variable, and that consider norms and values as separate, albeit related, issues. Interestingly, the only other study of social capital in post-Soviet society undertaken through the World Bank's Social Capital Initiative, Richard Rose's study of social capital networks in Russia, likewise uses this more restrictive definition of social capital to examine networks in post-socialist Russia (Rose 1998) . Finally, this study particularly stresses the context-dependent nature of social capital. As Foley and Edwards have argued, the way in which networks are embedded in broader socioeconomic contexts and can link individuals to resources determines whether or not a social network has social capital. In their terms, then, "social capital = resources + access" (see Foley and Edwards 1999) . We also support those theorists who argue that norms of trust and reciprocity are more usefully considered separately from social capital, so as not to confuse their cause-andeffect relationships with social networks.
Although similar processes are under way in other post-socialist countries, we chose to pilot this study in the Kyrgyz Republic for several reasons. First, the country has become drastically impoverished since independence. As of 1997, more than half the population lived below the poverty line, and the gap between rich and poor (indicated by a Gini coefficient of 4.7) was second only to that of Russia among the post-socialist countries (World Bank 1999) . In addition, informal kinship and neighborhood-based social networks have long played an important role in Kyrgyz society, both during the Soviet period and in pre-Soviet times, when tribal and clan loyalties were based on mutual webs of obligation and protection. Although the Kyrgyz have had a shorter history with Islam than many Central Asian groups, it is nevertheless important to add that they have also been influenced by the emphasis Islam places on the importance of family solidarity and mutual assistance (see Coudouel, McAuley, and Micklewright 1997, p. 202) . Finally, the Kyrgyz Republic was one of 23 participating countries in the World Bank's recent "Voices of the Poor" study, and the Kyrgyz case study was managed in the field by one of the authors of this study (Kathleen Kuehnast) . By returning to the same sites with the same local interviewers, the authors were able to build upon the interviewers' experience, the relationships they had already established in the field, and the rich qualitative data they had already collected in the poorest oblasts (regions) and Bishkek.
For this study, "networks" are defined as a web of relationships through which goods, services, money, and information are traded, and through which mutual obligation and gift-giving activities directly enhance social status. It is assumed in this study that personalized systems of exchange are based on different motives and values than those of anonymous markets. Interviews were designed to elicit information from respondents on the characteristics of their networks, the kinds of transactions that predominated within each network, and finally, the changes in the structure, size, and importance of their networks during the last 10 years. Although the limited number of sites and respondents does not allow us to generalize the findings for Kyrgyz society as a whole, similar findings from other recent studies in the Kyrgyz Republic suggest that they do indeed represent a countrywide phenomenon. (See Mikhalev and Heinrich (1999) and Rumer (1996) .)
The categories "poor" and "nonpoor" used in this study largely refer to how study participants in the poorest three regions (oblasts) of the country identified themselves to interviewers.
The study was primarily designed to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic-particularly in rural regions-rather than to define these terms with precision. In general, poor respondents in the study had few assets, participated in increasingly flat or "horizontal" social networks, and had little or no cash. Nonpoor respondents had sufficient material and monetary resources to overcome financial setbacks, participated in extensive and diverse networks, and either had cash or were able to convert resources into cash easily. This study was conducted over a 6-week period between April and June 1999. Three local research teams 8 conducted 21 focus groups (involving 210 respondents) and 105 interviews in seven urban, semiurban, and rural communities of Naryn, Talas, and Jalal-Abad oblasts (regions), plus the capital city of Bishkek, with a purposively selected sample of poor and nonpoor respondents (table 1). 9 To select sites, we identified the three poorest oblasts (Talas, Jalal-Abad and Naryn) on the basis of 1999 World Bank poverty update (World Bank 1999). Local leaders and interviewers then identified two of the poorer villages or towns in each oblast. Focus groups were held at the chosen sites with poor, nonpoor (identified by discussions with local leaders at each site), and "special" groups such as local minorities, or rural migrants in the city, and in-depth interviews of two to three hours were conducted with seven poor and seven nonpoor, with a mix of age and sex in each group. 10 Individual respondents were selected in part by their willingness to be interviewed, their ability to articulate the social issues and, in some cases, on the basis of previous participation in the "Voices of the Poor" study. A high frequency of common themes emerged in the interviews, as did unique situational differences in individual social networks. The respondents identified as "poor" or "nonpoor" prior to the interview, working with the interviewer, filled in detailed matrices documenting the kind and frequency of transactions in which they regularly engaged.
8. The research team consisted of 12 interviewers who had been trained in methods of Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA), as well as in-depth interview and focus group techniques. All the interviewers had participated in the previous World Bank study "Voices of the Poor." The interviewers originated in each of the oblasts in which they did their research, which assured greater comprehension of local conditions and regional problems.
9. The village sites were Urmural and Beisheke (Talas Oblast); At-Bashy and Ak-Kiya (Naryn Oblast); and Kok Yangak and Achy (Jalal-Abad Oblast).
10. A man and a woman were each chosen from the following age categories: under 30, between 30 and 50, and between 50 and 65. One respondent over 65, of either sex, was also interviewed.
In each oblast, one person kept a 6-week diary of his or her transactions. The interviewers recruited women to keep the diaries, because the women were more engaged in the day-to-day transactions that link network participants. As Cynthia Werner (2000) noted from her own fieldwork in Central Asia, women tend to be "more active in maintenance of social networks by serving guests, exchanging gifts, and helping others prepare food for guests… [whereas] men are more active in the manipulation of social networks, as they are the ones who typically 'call in favors.'" Qualitative research is very labor-intensive; the time required to review and analyze the 105 interviews and 21 focus group reports was considerable. Common themes, as well as points of divergence, were noted and then analyzed only by returning repeatedly to the original interviews and reports. The end result is a detailed view of how social networks function among some Kyrgyz today.
Background: Social Networks during the Soviet Period
Better a hundred friends than a hundred rubles. Russian proverb popular during the Soviet era 11
During the socialist period, webs of personal relationships were the principal "currency" in society. 12 Although basic goods and services were heavily subsidized and widely affordable, informal social networks were the most important mechanisms for getting things done, obtaining access to "deficit" goods and services, acquiring accurate information about events and opportunities, circumventing regulation and, in combination with bribes, gaining access to elite education, high-quality health care, and positions of power. This network-based economy of reciprocal favors, referred to in Russian as sviazy (connections), was an important feature of the centralized socialist economy that helped people to compensate for failures of the state.
11. Although this proverb was known throughout the FSU, it dates back to the Russian Empire.
12. For an excellent explanation of reciprocity within informal social networks and the use of blat in the Soviet Union, see James Millar, The ABCs of Soviet Socialism, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1981. For a more recent treatment of the same subject, see Natalia Dinello, "The Russian F-Connection: Finance, Firms, Friends, Families and Favorites." Problems of Post-Communism 46, no. 1 (1999): 26. Although the networks of ordinary people and the elite largely functioned independently of one another, the relatively egalitarian conditions of Soviet society enabled most people to establish far-reaching networks. Most people perceived their predicaments as similar and were not ashamed to ask favors or borrow money from one another, because guaranteed employment and stable incomes made it likely they could return the debt or favor in the future. In the Soviet shortage economy, who one was and whom one could access were far more important than the money one had saved. Thus, status and power depended less on income than on the extent to which one's informal networks included people with blat (pull or influence). Such individuals were typically close to sources of political, social, and economic power and were capable of pulling the levers of power within an institution to fulfill a request. As Larissa Lomnitz (1988) concluded from a comparative study of Mexico, Chile, and the Republic of Georgia, the more a social system is "bureaucratically formalized, regulated, planned, and yet unable to fully satisfy social requirements, the more it tends to create informal mechanisms." Social networks in the Kyrgyz Republic represent one such mechanism.
Such informal networks were not only a response to the inadequacies of formal institutions in the FSU. In Central Asia, these networks emerged from traditional kinship ties that proved to be exceptionally strong. Prior to Sovietization, tribal and clan relations constituted the basis of economic and political collective well-being in Central Asia. No individual could survive without the protective mantle of tightly woven networks of extended relatives who lived across the once nomadic territory. Customary laws that regulated marriage and elaborate rituals of gift-giving centered around life-cycle celebrations provided safety, security, and social status in the pre-Soviet world of the Kyrgyz. This pattern of expansive and influential kinship networks persisted despite attempts of the Soviet regime to weaken them. One typical Soviet prohibition forbade family gatherings of more than 100 people-in a society where hundreds of relatives had traditionally gathered for weddings or funerals.
At the same time, the elaborate system of Soviet collective farms often grouped extended families and clan groups together, thereby reinforcing kinship networks by ensuring that their members lived and worked in the same location. The informal networks that became a Soviet way of life integrated easily with Central Asian practices of gift exchange and Islamic concepts of charity, both of which reinforced mutual support among kinship groups, friends, neighbors, and col-leagues. Consequently, sorting out the various strands of Soviet networks, Central Asian social obligations, and the practices of an emerging market economy was one of the more challenging tasks of the following analysis.
Findings
Qualitative poverty studies carried out since 1993 in countries of the FSU reveal that the informal social networks of the poor have deteriorated. The purpose of this study, carried out in the Kyrgyz Republic in 1999, was to investigate the impact of socioeconomic change on the characteristics and functions of the social networks of poor and nonpoor households in rural and urban communities. A better understanding of the role of informal networks in Kyrgyz society, it was thought, should help development specialists devise more effective ways to reach out to the poor and excluded, while ensuring that the benefits of development were not simply captured by those with more effective and far-reaching connections. The findings reveal that the social networks of the poor and nonpoor have polarized and separated, paralleling the sharp socioeconomic stratification that has taken place since independence. Poverty and the increased penetration of market relations have significantly altered family-and clan-based networks and, to a lesser extent, networks based on work, friendship, and neighborhood. The disintegration of kin-based networks was striking in cash-starved and isolated rural regions, where the poor could no longer afford to participate in essential gift exchanges or life-cycle celebrations, nor maintain contact with relatives and acquaintances living in other villages or towns.
Not only had networks of the poor and nonpoor begun to separate, they had each changed in character. The nonpoor in urban communities and, to a lesser extent, in rural communities, were moving away from networks based on ascriptive relationships to more "modern," interest-based networks through which they successfully exploited access to resources (for example, "insider" information, credit, and preferential treatment by government offices). By contrast, the shrinking networks of the poor reduced their access to decent health care, good education, and timely social assistance, services that are increasingly mediated by personal connections. Indigenous systems of selfhelp, including rotating savings clubs and mutual aid obligations, were moving out of reach of the very poor, who were unable to afford even modest cash contributions. Catastrophic events were even forc-ing some poor into patron-client relationships and other varied forms of exploitation. These findings have important implications for community-based approaches aimed at empowering the poor and expanding their economic opportunities. Since person-centered networks in the Kyrgyz Republic remain important for regulating access to important resources, interventions should be designed to ensure that the poor, who are increasingly excluded from informal networks and unable to penetrate the expanding sector of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are directly represented and specifically targeted. Given the continuing practical role of social networks as informal safety nets, greater attention should also be paid to investing in rural infrastructure, so that deteriorating transportation and communications services do not further isolate poor communities.
The key findings of the study, which illustrate the impact of poverty on the form and function of informal social networks in the post-Soviet Kyrgyz Republic, are summarized below. Given the case study approach and small sample numbers, the findings can be considered propositions to be further investigated and tested, rather than definitive conclusions. 
At present, it is more useful to have a wide network than one hundred rubles, because if you have connections in all structures, and acquaintances in different departments and institutions, you can easily solve any problem.
Focus Group with the nonpoor, At-Bashy village
The gradual encroachment of market relations, the curtailment of state support, and the drastic decline in living standards for the majority of the population in the Kyrgyz Republic have intensified people's reliance on personal networks for support. As they did during the Soviet-era shortage economy, people continue to engage extensively in informal exchanges and barter within networks made up of family members, colleagues or classmates, and neighbors. Even the practice of exchanging favors within a certain circle of friends or acquaintances in order to reach someone with blat has continued to operate. During the Soviet period, people used blat to obtain deficit goods and services that money alone could not buy. Although most goods and services can be acquired today with money, people often resort to blat to help augment their incomes (for example, by circumventing official procedures to obtain valuable productive assets or lucrative employment).
Even though the rural population is often associated with social networks of long-term duration, the economic problems of transition have left such networks highly vulnerable. It is an unfortunate paradox that at a time when these networks have become ever more critical for survival, poverty has weakened kinship ties and made it more difficult for the poor to maintain critical support networks. In particular, rural poor respondents identified privatization of collective farms as the pivotal event that changed their daily lives and dramatically altered their social networks. Where once the collective farm was the nerve center of the rural economy, providing employment as well as a critical social safety net for households, privatization pushed many households into subsistence agriculture and severed the continuity of relationships developed over decades of collectivization. The "new" poor emerged significantly during the mid-1990s as privatization spread throughout the rural regions. 13 For the nonpoor, networks are important not only for maintaining their social standing, but also for ensuring their future security and prosperity, particularly in the absence of institutional stability. Thus, personal connections to people with official or unofficial power and access to important information have become more essential for finding employment, obtaining loans, establishing enterprises, gaining admission to elite educational institutions, or simply avoiding harassment from officials. In many cases, these networks include influential figures or government officials who share information for financial gain. Such exchanges among the nonpoor are reciprocal, equal, and timely.
The importance of having channels for obtaining information, particularly in information-hungry rural areas, can hardly be overstated. Most periodicals are distributed in Bishkek, whereas in outlying areas, the high cost of paper, transportation problems, and lack of funds means that even those who can afford to subscribe may not receive newspapers for weeks at a time. For those who own them, television and radio are the most important sources of information, but since many remote areas lack reliable electricity, people learn even about government decisions and presidential decrees through word of mouth-and often very late (British Broadcasting Corporation 2001).
Finding 2: The size of networks and frequency of social encounters have significantly decreased among the poor. As a result, the rural poor find themselves increasingly isolated: economically, geographically and socially. Simultaneously, the nonpoor are increasingly reluctant to provide support to poor relatives. Focus Group with the poor, At-Bashy Important formal and informal networks of the poor that formerly centered on the workplace and were reinforced by work relationships have disintegrated as privatization and restructuring of industrial and agricultural enterprises have scattered former colleagues. Urban and rural neighborhoods have altered as impoverished households sold apartments or land to former Communist elites, and new entrepreneurs quickly mastered the rules of the new economy. Isolated villages, deteriorating communications infrastructure, and decreased access to affordable transportation have limited the ability of the rural poor to participate in the nascent market economy.
Even when social networks of the poor remain dense, they tend to be relatively flat, linking together those with the fewest resources and least potential to assist one another. At best, they help the poor avoid further impoverishment. The poor have difficulty maintaining networks with the nonpoor because they are unable to afford an acceptable level of traditional gifts. Although some of the poor have deliberately withdrawn from relationships to save face, others have been excluded by newly rich relatives, whose behavior they consider cruel, insensitive, and a shameful violation of kinship obligations. The nonpoor, on the other hand, characterize the growing distance between poor and nonpoor as an inevitable part of a market economy, in which it is necessarily "every person for himself or herself." Their strategic deployment of social networks to improve their economic and social status is replacing their traditional obligation to support poor relatives financially.
Despite long-standing kinship ties, a network of close relatives in the Kyrgyz Republic today may number as few as 10 to 15 people. Respondents consistently ranked this circle of relatives as their most important network, partly because they considered it "more appropriate" to deal with relatives than nonrelatives. At the same time, they stressed that ties between previously close kin have weakened during the last decade because people are hesitant to rely on relatives for assistance. The economic crisis has even caused rifts in traditionally important sibling relationships, most noticeably among the poor. It has become more difficult to visit relatives because transportation is no longer subsidized, and the poor cannot afford bus tickets that have increased threefold in price. In addition, poorly maintained roads now prevent buses and trucks from traveling to many rural areas in winter. Thus, visits between relatives, typically accompanied by exchanges of gifts, farm produce, and other items at weddings, funerals, or birthday celebrations, take place with less frequency.
As the nonpoor increasingly distance themselves from poor relatives, the latter criticize their lack of support and disdain for traditional kinship obligations. As a result, tensions have increased among extended families. Respondents noted that family relations are best maintained when a family member whose authority is recognized by all relatives actively works to maintain good communication. If such a person moves away or becomes unable to communicate with the extended family, relations deteriorate and contacts diminish, further isolating poorer family members.
Particularly in isolated regions, neighbors often play a more central role than do relatives in the day-to-day lives of the poor, a fact captured by the Kyrgyz saying, "Buy a neighbor, not a house." Both the urban and rural poor rank neighbors as second only to kin in importance. Neighbors lend each other small sums of money, food, and other basic necessities on a daily basis. They also exchange services and assist each other at weddings or funerals. In rural areas, groups of neighbors sometimes join to purchase diesel fuel and seeds, rent a tractor or combine harvester, irrigate their fields, or locate a market or mill. For these reasons, a good neighbor is valued more than a distant relative.
Yet even neighbors socialize less than in the past, when it was customary to meet several times a day. Now such encounters may take place once a week or even once a month, and then only when they happen to meet on the street or at the bazaar. In the past, when people received a visit from relatives, they also invited neighbors, a practice that created large, overlapping networks of relatives, friends, and neighbors. Decreased social visits among relatives and less casual socializing among neighbors have drastically reduced opportunities to expand networks in this manner and, consequently, have diminished mutual support. In contrast to the situation during the Soviet era, money has become a key mechanism for establishing and mobilizing networks. During the Soviet period, when separate spheres of exchange operated on the basis of different currencies (for example, money, deficit goods, information, favors, and so forth), money was by no means the principal currency. Most people received regular cash salaries that covered basic needs, but relied on extensive informal networks based on mutual obligations to obtain many difficult-to-find consumer items. In most transactions, obtaining access to something was more difficult than paying for it and the amount of money involved was usually nominal. Even for expensive purchases or large bribes, the exchange of money was carefully brokered by trusted intermediaries.
Today, with consumer items readily available for cash, but priced at world market levels, money has assumed greater practical, as well as symbolic, value. Much of the focus within families is now on the need to make money. This is especially true for the poor, because even state pensions are often paid in kind with flour or oil. Money has also become essential in the exchange of gifts, either as the means for purchasing an expensive gift or as the gift itself. In nongift exchanges involving services, favors, or information, money has also become an important part of the transaction. The emphasis on cash-based exchange has also affected how people perceive relationships. In the past, favors or services were often provided in the context of long-term relationships in which the giver trusted the recipient to return the favor in the future. Trust has since diminished, and has become more short-term. Thus, most people prefer to receive their payment immediately, and in cash.
Although this practice further excludes the poor, it has directly aided the nonpoor, who can more easily deploy financial resources to bypass traditional or well-established networks. Indeed, even among kin, the transactions of the nonpoor increasingly involve money, because they have managed to dissociate wealth from its negative Soviet connotations and no longer think "having money" suggests illegal or immoral activities. Even friendship has become contingent on wealth. Asked if a hundred friends are still better than a hundred rubles, nonpoor respondents generally observed that few problems could be resolved without personal connections, but that important personal connections can no longer be established without money. As a schoolteacher from At Bashy explained, "Many people nowadays can't participate in networks because they don't have enough money for it, so they only associate with those who are as poor as they are, because then neither party is obliged to the other and their relations are free of these problems." As for kin, the nonpoor regularly review and assess the financial implications of maintaining relationships with poor relatives who expect their frequent help.
Limited resources have also taken a toll on friendships among the poor, because gifts-and, therefore, money-are required to sustain them. Friendship is now seen as a luxury and not a necessity. In response to the question of whether a hundred friends are still better than a hundred rubles, a poor respondent replied that no one could afford a hundred friends anymore. He reminisced about pretransition life, when friends frequently gathered to celebrate birthdays and other holidays, attend the cinema and theater, or hike in summer, without ever thinking about how much they spent. With unemployment and poverty, such gatherings have become infrequent, and life for the poor, as they describe it, has become dismal and lonely.
Finding 4: Because the poor find it increasingly difficult to participate in ceremonial events, they are becoming gradually excluded from kinship and other important networks. By contrast, the nonpoor are host-ing ever-more-lavish social events as a way of diversifying their networks and expanding their access to a vast array of resources. Focus Group with the poor, Achy
People in the Kyrgyz Republic, as elsewhere in Central Asia, depend on person-centered informal networks that are reaffirmed through the rich ceremonial and social life that characterizes these societies. Life-cycle celebrations and rituals, toi in Kyrgyz-connected with birth, marriage, and death-are pivotal encounters that help people cultivate, maintain, and expand networks through the reciprocal exchange of gifts and other material and nonmaterial items, including information, favors, and advice. 14,15 Although gift exchange constitutes a significant portion of an ordinary household's annual expenditures, people strive to maintain this tradition because they know they must give in order to receive. As the Kyrgyz proverb says, Kattashpasa jakyn tuugan jat bolot (if you don't stay in touch with your family, they will become strangers to you one day).
Elaborate gift exchange is not only pivotal to the maintenance of social networks; it is essential to Kyrgyz social identity. Through the activities involved in gift giving, families gain social recognition as responsible members of their kinship group, neighborhood, or community. Within the Kyrgyz extended family, gift transactions are val-14. Toi-A celebration that takes place for such events as births, circumcisions, marriages, anniversaries, or housewarmings. The most important tois are: sunnot toi-circumcision, uilonuu toi-marriage of a son, kyz toi-marriage of a daughter, iu toi-house warming, beshik toi-presentation by the parents of a new mother to her and her family upon the birth of the first child.
15. For a detailed investigation of similar rituals and networks in rural China, see Yan (1996) . ued as an indication of upstanding moral behavior, even though achieving this level of morality may entail considerable economic deprivation or indebtedness. The understanding that family honor depends on appropriate participation in obligatory gift exchange pressures poor families to borrow beyond their capacity, a practice some people attribute to the negative Kyrgyz trait of sokur namys (blind pride). (See Rao (2001) for useful comparative data.)
Ironically, the poorer rural population appears to celebrate many more events, ceremonies, and traditions than do their more prosperous urban counterparts. In a region where there are more unpredictable calamities such as drought, extreme cold, and other hardships, these celebrations provide not only a respite from such difficulties, but also an important venue for reaffirming old ties and creating new ones as a form of life insurance. Consequently, rural participants in the study noted that the profit they earn during the year through hard manual labor is mostly spent in the autumn on these celebrations. Even though these traditions and practices are considered burdensome at times, the participants agreed that they are essential to social relations, because such relations are the primary conduit for finding jobs, locating food and fuel at low prices, and gathering important information on everything from changing governmental policies to future marriage partners for their children. Rao argues that in addition to their "direct utility," such social networks are an essential element in poverty alleviation strategies. Thus, such celebrations and rituals observed within social networks provide the public arena in which families are scrutinized and tested, where reputations are made, broken, or enhanced. According to Rao (2001, p. 89) , life-cycle events become theaters where public reputations are maintained, and stadiums where people compete in games of status competition. "Because these structures provide rules for what is considered appropriate behavior, they determine the criteria by which people are judged."
It is at such life-cycle events that obligatory gift exchange is transacted. As Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh-Jones have noted, gift exchange underwrites social relations and is concerned with social reproduction (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 1992, p. 7) . Similarly, gift giving in Kyrgyz society operates according to specific rules and norms that vary according to the type of network. Giving a gift creates indebtedness on the part of the recipient, who is obliged to repay the giver at some future date with a gift of equal or greater value. Failure to do so puts the reputation of the indebted individual or household at risk. Indeed, most households carefully record gift exchanges in a spe-cial notebook, which they consult when they receive or issue an invitation, to remind them what gift they should give or expect.
In Central Asia, weddings and funerals are two life-cycle rituals pivotal to maintaining social status and preserving social networks. Because marriage has the primary purpose of linking kinship groups rather than individuals, some respondents judged the wedding to be the most important community celebration. Although Soviet authorities outlawed traditional practices of sep beruu or dowry (payments by the bride's family) and kalym (payment made by the groom's family to the bride's family), these traditions never completely disappeared and are now reasserting themselves. 16, 17 From pre-Soviet times, kalym, usually paid in the form of cattle, displayed the wealth, influence, and prestige of the groom's family. Many rural families still give kalym in the form of money, sheep, or horses and such items as fabric, blankets, and clothing to important members of the bride's extended family. Collection of the dowry begins with the birth of a girl and is given to the groom's family at the time of engagement.
Since 1991, the value of gifts given for kalym and dowry, as well as the actual cost of weddings, has significantly increased. Respondents estimated that payment for gifts exchanged at the first meeting of future parents-in-law required 10,000 to 15,000 soms (at the 1999 exchange rate of 48 soms to the U.S. dollar, some $208-312), whereas an average wedding cost between 50,000 and 250,000 soms (some $1,040-5,200). Today the "start-up costs" of marriage, including elaborate preparations for the wedding and recruitment of neighbors to host out-of-town guests, mean that rural families have fewer opportunities to establish close ties with people living in better-serviced urban areas, worsening the geographic isolation of their villages. In one case, rural respondents forced their son to renounce his chosen bride from Bishkek because they could not afford the required visits to her family in the city. This case illustrates a change from the Soviet period, when 16 . Sep beruu-Kyrgyz, a bride's dowry may consist of furniture, refrigerator, washing machine, a television set, blankets, kitchenware, and a clothing chest.
17. Kalym usually consists of cash, kiit and keshik. Kiit refers to the clothing traditionally presented to all close relatives and to relatives of high social status who are close to the bride's parents. Keshik is boiled mutton or foal meat given when visiting a daughter or the son-in-law's parents. It must be fat, high-quality meat.
young Kyrgyz men often wed urban women to expand their family's network into urban areas, a strategy that opened up an array of educational and employment opportunities for the groom's entire family.
In customary Kyrgyz practice, funerals are also socially important, both to display respect for the deceased and to demonstrate the worth of his or her life. There are strong social expectations that a proper funeral ceremony will be organized when someone dies. The threat of social exclusion for failure to do so pressures poor households to take on large debts. The funeral itself is followed by further commemorations, such as one that takes place after 40 days, when relatives, friends, and colleagues meet at the home of the deceased. Many items and large amounts of money are exchanged at funerals, and serious conflicts may result if the goods presented are less in value than those received on a previous occasion. Because they are unable to pay for the trip or the required gifts, some of the poor have stopped attending funerals, 40-day commemorations, and other death-related events, despite their knowledge that failure to attend may provoke offended relatives to sever ties.
Thus, a major concern of the poor is the high cost of hosting or attending such celebrations or rituals, and bringing the obligatory gifts. Consequently, the poor are increasingly withdrawing from participation. For poorer households, celebrations once attended by hundreds of relatives and neighbors now include only the very closest relatives. As a result, poor households have fewer and fewer opportunities to maintain relationships, especially with relatives living in other communities. At the same time, the nonpoor increasingly refrain from inviting poorer relatives to events; in part, they wish to spare them the burden of purchasing gifts or the disgrace of failing to do so. Some nonpoor respondents candidly explained that maintaining relations with poor relatives is no longer beneficial to them. In fact, the nonpoor have increased their expenditures for such social and ceremonial events, which they see as useful opportunities for creating important alliances and strategically displaying their wealth and position. Elaborate funerals may cost more than $10,000 and involve 1,500 guests, all of whom will be accommodated with assistance from neighbors and extended family members.
Although the nonpoor, particularly the wealthier among them, have actively escalated the size and scope of ceremonial exchange, many joined poorer respondents in condemning lavish events as wasteful luxuries, and contrasted such excesses with the thriftier and more "rational" behavior of other ethnic groups. During interviews, poor and nonpoor respondents alike approvingly recalled how Soviet authorities had once reprimanded Communist Party leaders for organizing expensive commemorations. They commented that the pressure to organize and participate in extravagant ceremonies was damaging to households. Although many respondents felt that local elders should use their moral authority to encourage less costly funeral commemorations, they observed that some elders actively promote lavish expenditures in the name of tradition. The nonpoor, especially those who are less wealthy, are ambivalent about the custom. They feel pressured to compete, fearful that they will lose face if they fail to live up to traditional expectations. Interestingly, respondents from very different socioeconomic backgrounds called for government authorities and the mass media to publicly oppose this form of ritual competition. This common perspective shared by two segments of society that are rapidly diverging in income and opportunity may well reflect the legacy of egalitarian values absorbed during 70 years of Soviet rule. The poor are ashamed to go to a special event held by their relatives because they are unable to contribute 100 soms to razha, and as a result they gradually drop out of the family network. In some instances, relatives promise to make their contributions later. This might work for one or two events; however, when they systematically fail to contribute money, they are "simply forgotten" to be invited for the next event. That is how someone is dropped from the family networks.
Focus Group with the poor, At Bashi
Mutual aid, referred to in Kyrgyz as razha, or yntymak in some regions, is rendered through small monetary exchanges that exist in most communities, whether poor or nonpoor, rural or urban, Kyrgyz or non-Kyrgyz. Of course, this practice is by no means unique to the Kyrgyz Republic or Central Asia, but occurs throughout the world. Razha generally involves the practice of collecting small amounts (30-500 soms-$0.63-10.00), from members of a given social network on the occasion of a wedding or funeral. Most people participate in multiple razha networks of kin, neighbors, colleagues, and friends. People are automatically a part of kin-based razha networks from birth and from a very young age learn to be responsible to relatives and assume formal razha obligations after marriage. Respondents recalled that during the Soviet period, when most people had enough money to make such contributions, razha was regularly practiced among relatives and neighbors. The required contributions remained modest, however, because Soviet authorities, as noted above, punished attempts to hold large-scale private festivities.
This informal institution remains essential for the poor, because it is the only way they can hope to pay for a wedding or funeral. A normal contribution consists of 50 soms, which in large kinship networks of 100 or so people can cover the cost of the horse that should be butchered at the ceremony. But today, many family ties are weakening because not every family member can contribute even this small amount. And because most people participate in multiple razha networks, they have multiple obligations. Repeated failure to contribute means exclusion from the network, and exclusion means that an individual's household will not benefit in the future from razha contributions. The nonpoor still participate in razha exchanges, but more to maintain face than because they need this modest support.
Rotating savings associations, referred to by the Kyrgyz term sherine, or occasionally, in Russian as chërnaya kassa (literally, black cash register or till), are also found in the Kyrgyz Republic. These informal associations consist of people who make regular cash contributions to a fund that is given in whole or in part to each contributor in turn. A worldwide phenomenon, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are popular among poorer (but not the poorest) segments of the population. 18 During the Soviet period, ROSCAs were widespread among middle-income people, who usually participated in these associations at their workplace. In the Kyrgyz Republic, sherine has become particularly popular among the nonpoor. 19 Amounts of up to 250,000 soms collected on a single occasion are used toward the purchase of cars or expensive personal items, or to make investments. Such informal institutions can respond quickly to members' needs. By providing 18. See, for example, Low (1995) . Deniz Kandiyoti (1998) notes the practice of chërnaya kassa in Uzbekistan, where the practice functions as a rotating savings club. See also Kandiyoti (1999) .
19. Ardener (1995, p. 1) suggests that Taiwan is also a good example of a transition economy in which rotating savings clubs appeal to the emerging elite.
a reliable way to quickly raise large sums of money, they compensate for ineffective or nonexistent banking systems. There is a remarkably low rate of default on what are in effect loans, because participants are intensely concerned to avoid both social disgrace and exclusion from this useful exchange network.
Rotating savings clubs are more than just a way of raising money. They also provide the occasion for enjoyable social functions that provide people an opportunity to exchange information and professional advice. Half a dozen or more friends may take turns hosting each other, with or without families, using a portion of the cash contributions to prepare a lavish meal. Some sherine networks are exclusively male or female. A nonpoor female respondent, for example, described how she met with female friends each month to share a meal and discuss issues of personal interest. The women tended to use the money collected to purchase items for their household or expensive jewelry or clothing for themselves. People who are relatively poorer but have reliable incomes may participate in more modest sherine networks, to which they contribute only 100 soms, gathering over a meal to share news as well as to sing and dance. In such networks, however, recipients prefer to use the money to provision their household with several months' worth of staples such as flour, rice, and oil.
Finding 6: The relative importance of blat has increased for people without cash and decreased for people with cash. Access to public institutions and employment has declined for the poor, because such access is increasingly mediated by influential social networks. By contrast, the nonpoor are using enlarged and diversified networks to expand their access.
Those who have no connections will never be treated fairly. My son had a traffic accident. He was just sitting in a car parked by the side of the road, and another car, with a son of a high government official at the wheel, ran into it. First, the man admitted that it was his fault and even promised that he would pay for the repairs, but then he sued my son instead. Powerful connections let the man win the case, and my son was imprisoned.
Middle-aged woman, Focus Group Discussion, At Bashy
The importance of social networks for regulating access to public institutions and services is hardly new to post-Soviet society. Ironically, this importance has increased in the post-Soviet era.
Respondents were unanimous in asserting that blat had become essential for finding work, being admitted to a competitive university department or resolving a traffic dispute. Although blat often depends on bribery, it is nevertheless important to distinguish between these two modes of interaction. A key difference is that bribery is illegal, whereas legal codes do not refer to blat (for example, in terms of conflict of interest or nepotism). Rather, in local terms, bribery "implies a conflict of interest where one is to be 'compensated' for doing something one would not do otherwise, while blat is a form of cooperation and mutual support with a long-term perspective, implying trust rather than compensation for risk." 20 The success of blat depends on effective and supportive social networks, whereas bribery may or may not have to be supported by personal networks. During the Soviet period, bribery depended on blat, since bribes had to pass through trusted personal connections to the ultimate recipient. Today, it has become easier to rely primarily on bribery as the most expedient way of getting things done in the new economy, because the practice now has fewer legal and social repercussions. Although bribery allows people to circumvent networks because middlemen are no longer so essential to transactions, insider connections (sviazy) remain important, since it is often through such connections that one learns who can or should be bribed, what constitutes reasonable payment, and how to time the payment. Bribery requires specific techniques, depending on the organization involved (for example, a university, a tax or customs department, or a hospital). Such "technical" knowledge is local and specific, and depends on information provided through personal relationships. Even the nonpoor who move from rural to urban areas must obtain access to local social networks to identify which powerful individuals they should bribe to achieve their specific objectives.
Nonpoor respondents described how people used blat and bribery to gain important official positions. Despite the importance of blat during the Soviet period, many respondents argued that bright and talented people had more opportunities at that time to achieve positions 20. As a nonmonetary use of influence, blat was not new to Soviet Russia. As Alena Ledeneva (1998, p. 12 ) points out in her book, the term "blat" was derived from the Polish blat, which means someone who provides an umbrella, a cover. Prerevolutionary dictionaries imply that blat had connotations of criminal activity, but of the lesser order, such as petty thievery.
of importance without blat. Today, they assert, blat is essential for obtaining government positions and surviving in the new market environment. The nonpoor, for example, use blat to solve problems with tax inspectors, to deal with customs officers when they conduct commerce across borders, to favorably resolve a law suit, to expedite a loan, or to evade military service. Respondents' perceptions concerning the increased importance of blat are well worth noting. It is well documented from a host of studies that blat remains an active component of transactions in post-socialist societies.
Nonpoor respondents were reluctant to detail their own experiences with bribery, although they claimed that the practice was flourishing as never before (a perception possibly influenced by the fact that during the Soviet period, bribes were transacted covertly through personal networks). In general, they noted that people have become more open about bribery. They feel freer to demand bribes or to directly inquire how much they should pay for a specific favor.
The system of education in the Kyrgyz Republic exemplifies the continuing importance of bribery. In the Soviet times, bribes were frequently used to assure admittance to a school or university, but the amount required was usually manageable. Large sums are now needed to enroll a child in university and to find them employment after graduation. The practice is equally widespread in other public institutions. To register for child benefits, for example, one must pay 50 soms for the registration form and 17 soms for the application form. Officials openly keep the benefits for the first two months, a practice respondents are willing to endure as long as they eventually receive some money. Likewise, when a postal worker delivers a pension, he or she generally keeps 5 or 10 soms as the "delivery fee." The phenomenon of indebtedness in Kyrgyz society has serious consequences that range from shame to ruptured social relations, ostracism, and what some respondents referred to as "enslavement." For their daily needs, the poor generally borrow small sums of money (15-20 soms) from each other, usually agreeing beforehand when the money is to be repaid. Exchanges of money or goods must be equal and, in contrast to the Soviet past, people now keep exact accounts of what they borrow or lend. Failure to return the loan seriously strains relationships between neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, and within networks. A participant in the focus group of Kok Yangak described the change in neighborly relationships as follows, "In the past, we were not counting how many presents we gave. Today, our relations are measured by kilos. If you take a kilo of flour, half a bottle of oil, or half a kilo of sugar, you must return the same amount. Otherwise, you may get into trouble, or lose the trust of your neighbor. The next time, he will politely refuse to give you anything because last time you were dishonest."
To participate in more elaborate exchange networks or to attend ceremonial and social gatherings, however, the poor are often forced to borrow greater amounts, sometimes becoming so indebted that no one in their networks will lend further to them. One resident of At Bashi said, "I constantly ask my close relatives for support without giving them anything in return. I believe that if it goes on in this fashion, I will lose my network of relatives because they do not have enough money to support me like this." Economic and social pressures have pushed some of the poor into patron-client relationships with the nonpoor. These relationships are one way in which the latter exploit their networks and kinship norms, because they are able to depend on the cheap or free labor of poorer relatives.
The poor feel uncomfortable asking the nonpoor for assistance. Such transactions are unequal from the start: the poor understand that when they do borrow, failure to repay in full means that their creditor may call back the debt in the form of labor worth much more than the original loan. Nevertheless, personal tragedies, unforeseen economic shocks, and social obligations create predicaments in which the poor become indebted to their wealthier neighbors, former friends, and even relatives. A pattern described in some villages is as follows: the poor exhaust their food stocks over the winter, borrow money from wealthier neighbors, and then repay this debt the following summer by cultivating the neighbor's land. The pattern of indebtedness intensifies when public celebrations or a funeral impose social obligations on the poor, whose further borrowing limits their chances of escaping an increasingly vicious cycle of obligation and debt. Although nonpoor respondents referred to the help they rendered poor relatives and neighbors, the poor preferred to describe these "helping relationships" as a modern form of slavery in which the nonpoor exploited them to further their own economic advancement. Kyrgyz society, relatively egalitarian during the Soviet period, has become strikingly unequal. This inequality is reflected in the increasing dissimilarity of informal social networks of the poor and nonpoor and the separation of these networks from each other. The chasm between the poor and nonpoor is also widening in relation to their social values. Many of the poor describe those who have money as "thieves, crooks, or cheats." As a poor woman from Urmaral expressed it, "It is very difficult to gain wealth by honest work. Usually, people make their fortune by dishonest means." 21 Likewise, criticisms of the poor are made by the nonpoor, who call the former "lazy" and accuse them of "wanting to use their wealthier relatives as conduits to jobs or opportunities" instead of working hard.
Networks of the poor have become flat, linking people with similar incomes and assets. They have also shrunk in size and geographic reach, comprising increasingly smaller groups of people who live near each other. Links with people from higher-income groups have increasingly taken on the character of patronage relations. Even kinship networks, which once functioned as highly secure, dependable social safety nets that linked urban and rural relatives, have ceased to provide long-term security.
Networks of the nonpoor, on the other hand, have become more extensive geographically and more dense socially, reflecting the importance of networks for social and economic mobility. To maximize their utility, the nonpoor have attempted to reshape their networks, discarding some and cultivating others, thereby creating "modern" relationships of more practical value to their new economic circumstances. 22 The separation of networks sometimes takes on visible form. One respondent described a recent funeral in which participants divided themselves into separate groups based on the quality of their clothing. After the funeral, wealthy and poor guests entered the house of the deceased in two separate groups.
Not only have networks taken on different characteristics according to income level, they are also influenced by location. Because about 80 percent of the poor live in rural areas, networks of the rural poor are most affected. A majority of the rural poor are ethnic Kyrgyz whose traditional social networks were based extensively on elaborate giftgiving exchanges, a tradition now rendered much more difficult by poverty. Because collective farms, nonfarm enterprises, and schools once played a key role in bringing rural people together and cementing social networks, their closure has created additional impediments for social networks. With the demise of the collective enterprises, most rural Kyrgyz now survive on labor-intensive subsistence agriculture, which allows few opportunities for casual or formal socializing. Finally, roads are no longer maintained, spare parts are rarely available to repair buses or trucks, and what few phone lines once existed in rural communities have been largely destroyed by nonferrous metal "pirates" who strip copper from telephone wires to trade in China.
22. In many ways, these findings reinforce Mark Granovetter's observations that economic transactions are embedded in social relations and that economists often underestimate the significance of personal relationships and networks of relations in reform economies. See Granovetter (1985) .
Although the nonpoor in rural areas lack the wealth of their urban counterparts, they still act as gatekeepers in their communities, regulating access to goods, services, and information. Yet the reach of their networks is also limited by some of the same obstacles that confront the poor.
In major urban areas, recent migrants from rural areas and refugees from Tajikistan are among the poorest segments of the population. Both these groups of poor try to reestablish local networks with others from the same place of origin. These reestablished networks are both assets and liabilities. On the one hand, by joining people of similar origin and situations, they provide a buffer and some degree of assistance. Yet they also hinder the poor from extending their networks beyond their small groups and forming new relationships with others who might provide greater access to urban resources.
The urban nonpoor are in the most advantageous position. They have created a multiplicity of networks that reach into rural areas of the Kyrgyz Republic, as well as abroad, and include relationships with relatives, friends, schoolmates, colleagues, and neighbors of varying income levels. With easy access to a variety of resources, they maintain networks with rural relatives and friends, enjoying the respect and authority their continued attention brings. In urban areas, they have extensive access to a wealth of goods, private and public services, and most importantly, information about business, investment, and employment opportunities in the Kyrgyz Republic and abroad.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Since the beginning of the move toward a market economy, the multiple and overlapping informal networks that once linked relatives, neighbors, colleagues, and friends from different backgrounds, professions, and geographic regions have become increasingly polarized. In traditional Kyrgyz culture, elaborate gift exchange and a rich ceremonial life once structured social identity, status, and morality, creating supportive links among hundreds of people. The collective organization of Soviet life, much of which centered on workplace relationships, further enhanced the salience of social networks. Today, the transformation of the economy has dramatically transformed and polarized social relationships among the poor and nonpoor.
Impoverishment in the post-Soviet context has had a doubly negative impact on the poor, first, by reducing their ability to maintain support networks, and second, by increasing the need to rely on networks to maintain access to services. In some cases, debt and dependency have pushed the poor into patron-client relationships, sometimes under the guise of "helping relationships" with wealthier relatives or neighbors. The nonpoor, by contrast, have actively reshaped their networks. Marketization and new forms of competition have robbed traditional and morally sanctioned relationships of their value, while creating important incentives for the nonpoor to expand and diversify interest-based relationships as a means of enhancing social mobility. Reluctant to maintain financially draining relationships with poor relatives, the nonpoor consciously espouse values that diminish the importance of ascriptive identities, and strategically deploy longestablished as well as recently formed networks with people who have equal or greater resources.
The dynamics of post-socialism and the changing availability of resources have also affected the social capital of individuals and groups. Because the maintenance of most social networks requires resources, the new poor have found themselves with diminished social capital simply because they have few resources. For example, previously well-connected individuals whose networks were embedded in a sector now in decline, such as collective agriculture, are likely to find that their social capital has completely eroded. Although they may have maintained their networks, the types of resources to which these networks now provide access have lost their usefulness and therefore their value. Thus, not only has the size of the networks of previously well-established people shrunk, the relationships that have survived now primarily link people who have few resources. Moreover, generalized trust, often considered a component of social capital, can hardly be said to exist in the studied communities. Such trust as does exist is highly context bound, and can be characterized as the confidence that participants have in a transaction that their counterparts will honor their part of the contract. Yet in the current situation, even such transaction-based trust has diminished. People tend to prefer short-term exchanges, preferably in cash.
The diminished social capital of the poor raises important policy considerations. As Rao (2001) argues, the infusion of market-driven values and mechanisms is eroding links between the social networks of the poor and the nonpoor. Although these relationships were previously based on traditional systems of status, the nonpoor now find the emphasis on the shared values of reciprocity and assistance counterproductive to their own interests, especially in the unstable new economic environment. For the nonpoor, attending the celebrations or funerals of poor relatives no longer enhances their social capital. Because social pressure within the extended family to adhere to traditional familial obligations has also diminished, the nonpoor are even less likely to provide an informal safety net for struggling relatives. In fact, as Rao demonstrates and as our Kyrgyz respondents noted, the nonpoor's economic standing may increase their need to demonstrate their upward mobility to their peers, thus explaining why lavish displays of wealth at life-cycle celebrations are on the increase for the nonpoor and why the nonpoor do not feel obligated to invite or attend to the needs of their poorer relatives.
These findings argue for both the continued importance of supporting formal institutions that serve the poor and for assessing ways in which development interventions can directly reach the poor. Supporting formal institutions is important for providing viable alternatives to patronage relations that force the poor to rely on the dense and resource-rich networks of the nonpoor. Increased support of formal institutions with a stronger emphasis on transparency and complete and timely information could help compensate for the inability of the poor to muster powerful connections to access services. Yet development specialists must also carefully consider avenues for bridging economic differences between the poor and nonpoor rather than further exacerbating these differences, for example, by introducing market reforms too abruptly. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the closure of Soviet-era collective farms and state enterprises has caused particular hardships for the poor, for whom these institutions served as a hub of important social relationships, as well as provider of social services. Thus, the study reinforces Mark Granovetter's observations that economic transactions are embedded in social relations, and reminds us not to underestimate the significance of personal relationships and networks of relations in transition economies (see Granovetter (1985) .
Although the World Bank policies increasingly stress the importance of ensuring inclusion, empowerment, and security for the poor, the capacity to address poverty is weakened by an exclusive focus on the poverty side of the equation. This study argues that the complete story, with attention to the relationships between the poor and nonpoor, must be told. There is little doubt that it is more difficult to "study up," 23 yet grasping how the nonpoor use social networks in their daily lives is essential for understanding how prevailing norms and beliefs about the poor operate in a given society. This understanding is also essential for developing policies that create incentives for the nonpoor to act in ways that enhance inclusion rather than increase the exclusion of the poor.
Greater attention to affordable and reliable rural infrastructure, from roads to communications, could also assist the poor in better maintaining their social networks, which still play a role in their everyday and long-term survival. One of the more constructive ways to assist these networks is by maintaining both rural roads and roadways that are on the outskirts of cities, where many of the urban poor live. Roads allow the poor not only to access support networks, but also make it possible to access employment, markets, schools, and medical care. Telephones give people moral support, as well as the means to exchange useful information. With the support of formal institutions and infrastructure, opportunities for sustainable income generation would become more feasible.
Community-based programs that assist the poor must also recognize the indigenous support systems in the Kyrgyz Republic as viable mechanisms for their programs. Many such support systems (for example, razha and sherine) have been in place for generations and are already familiar to the community. 24 Community-based projects that use these fundamental building blocks of Kyrgyz society could leverage established social relationships to achieve wider inclusion of the very poor. Finally, development interventions that stress direct outreach to the poor must be carefully designed with knowledge of the powerful gatekeeping role of local elites, especially in rural regions. It should be recalled that local NGOs are predominately staffed by such elites. If project interventions do not carefully take into account their complex role, resources may well end up in the pockets of the gatekeepers and not in the hands of poorer community members. 25 In summary, increased formal institutional support, improved infrastructure, sustainable employment opportunities, and well-designed community programs that reach out directly to the poor could help level an economic playing field that is growing ever more uneven in the post-socialist Kyrgyz Republic. In addition, exploring the interrelationships between the poor and nonpoor, especially their social networks, is a first step toward developing new ways to bridge the growing gulf between these socioeconomic groups. Engaging the nonpoor directly in poverty alleviation efforts and finding new incentives for them to maintain or create linkages with the poor should be part of the social development agenda.
